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LIABILITY OF ENGINEERS FOR STRUCTURAL DESIGN
ERRORS: STATE OF THE ART
CONSIDERATIONS IN DEFINING THE
STANDARD OF CARE·
JOHN C. PECKt
WYATI A. HOCHt
Based on their delineation of four distinct strata of knowledge
within the engineering profession, the authors propose a standard
of care for engineers that reflects advances in knowledge and de-
sign theory but that stops short of strict liability,
I. INTRODUCTION
I N 1970, MAD Magazine's "Scenes We'd Like to See"l fea-tured a three frame cartoon entitled "The Ribbon Cutting
Ceremony." The first frame depicts a new suspension bridge
over a harbor, an assembled crowd, and a tuxedo-clad mayor pre-
paring to cut the ceremonial ribbon, The second frame catches
the mayor carefully cutting the ribbon, The third frame portrays
disaster as, to everyone's horror, the bridge collapses-the impli-
cation being that the ribbon alone had supported the entire
structure.
MAD Magazine's satirical poke at the design profession and
construction industry bears a double-edged truth: the
cartoonist's suspension bridge. with its long structural spans,
high strength materials. and infinite public access, symbolizes the
triumphs of twentieth century engineering and technology; new
structures continue to span greater distances with less material
and more aesthetic grace. Yet, during the past decade, some cata·
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strophic failures have occurred. Those at Kansas City's Kemper
Arena,2 Hartford's Civic Center Coliseum,3 and Boston's John
Hancock Tower4 resulted in enormous economic loss. The Kan-
sas City Hyatt Regency walkway5 and the Harbour Cay condomin-
ium6 collapses caused human injury and loss as well. Failures
such as these, occurring both during construction and after initial
occupancy or use, have focused public and professional attention
on the myriad potential hazards in large structures that shelter
thousands of people and represent millions of dollars in capital
investment.
These and other less spectacular structural failures also have
provided the legal system with the opportunity to refine the scope
and degree of the engineer's duties. Ironically, however, large
failures create such overwhelming economic loss that most dam-
age suits are settled by the parties prior to trial, leaving a dearth
of reported court opinions on the engineer's r~sponsibilities.
Any structural failure may embody numerous and often con-
2. Part of Kemper Arena's 324-foot clear-span roof collapsed to the floor
during an intense rain and wind storm on June 4, 1979. Subsequent investiga-
tion revealed that high-strength bolts subjected to dynamic loading conditions
fatigued under recurrent movement, precipitating the collapse. See Rocking That
Fatigued Bolts Felled Arena Roof, ENGINEERING NEWS REC., Aug. 16, 1979, at 10-12.
3. The 360' x 300' steel space frame roof of Hartford's Civic Center Coli-
seum collapsed on January 18, 1978, after several days of heavy snow, rain, and
freezing temperatures. Although the $30 million building was heavily damaged,
no injuries were reported. See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, TOWARDS
SAFER LONG-SPAN BUILDINGS 3 (1981) [hereinafter cited as AlA]; Smith & Ep-
stein, Hartford Coliseum Roof Collapse: Structural Collapse Sequence and Lessons
Learned, CIVIL ENGINEERING-ASCE, Apr., 1980, at 59-62.
4. Foundation, structural steel, and glass curtainwall problems have
plagued the 60 story, rhomboid-shaped John Hancock Tower in Boston.
Curtainwall glass breakage caused by unanticipated wind loading, minute inclu-
sions or defects in the glass, and possibly inadequate structural stiffness delayed
the building's occupancy for five years and prompted replacement of all 10,344
glass units on the tower. See J. O'BRIEN, CONSTRUCTION DELAY 348-56 (1976).
5. The walkway's spectacular collapse on July 17, 1981, claimed 114 lives,
the most ever in an American structural failure. Two 117-foot long "skywalks,"
which spanned a five-story atrium area of the hotel, failed under 53% of the
minimum load capacity required by the Kansas City Municipal and Uniform
Building Codes. After extensive destructive testing on specimens obtained from
the walkway debris, the National Bureau of Standards concluded that the most
probable cause of failure was insufficient load capacity in the suspended walks'
supporting connections. National Bureau of Standards, Investigation of The Kansas
City Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse 249,251 (1982).
6. On March 27, 1981, 11 construction workers were killed when the entire
five-story structure in Cocoa Beach, Florida, collapsed. A National Bureau of
Standards report cited insufficient punching shear capacity in the fifth floor rein-
forced concrete slab, which failed during a concrete pour, as the cause of the
accident. See Florida Collapse Blamed on Design, ENGINEERING NEWS REC., June 18,
1981, at 39.
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current causes outside the design professional's7 control. These
include defects in materials, improper member fabrication, inade-
quate inspection or supervision during construction, and loads
exceeding design loads. Engineering design error, however, is a
major contributing cause which is wholly within the engineer's
control. The advent of more complex structural systems, such as
the space frame,8 the use of high-strength weldable metals,9 the
increased magnitude and types of structural loadings,1O and the
industry's reliance on minimum-cost systems!! may have ex-
panded the engineer's responsibilities and in turn heightened his
liabilityexposure.!2
Additionally, the continuing force of empirical research may
7. The terms "design professional," "architect" and "engineer" are used
interchangeably throughout this article to designate individuals responsible for
design services on a construction project.
8. Space frames or space frameworks are "[t]hree-dimensional structures
composed of a number of bars hinged together in such a manner as to form a
rigid framework." C. NORRIS & j. WILBUR, ELEMENTARY STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
116 (2d ed. 1960). Space frames have been defined alternatively as "three-di-
mensional structural systems composed of interconnected members, other than
bearing walls, and laterally supported to function as a complete, self-contained
unit, with or without the aid of horizontal diaphragms or floor bracing systems."
STANDARD HANDBOOK FOR CIVIL ENGINEERS § 15-12 (F. Merrit 3d ed. 1983).
One commentator has described the design advantages of space frames in the
following way:
Space frames possess a positive aesthetic quality by having a molecular-
type structure which tends to duplicate nature. Structural materials are
utilized efficiently, since space frames span in more than one direction.
With the use of high-strength materials, larger column-free spans can
be attained, thereby providing a greater flexibility of usage within the
structure. Space frames provide great rigidity and inherent redun-
dancy, which results in an increased safety factor. Most space frame
systems utilize extensive prefabrication in the shop, thereby eliminating
the need for highly skilled field labor. Many space frames can be as-
sembled on the ground, thus resulting in increased construction safety
and further reduction in skilled labor. Space frames possess a versatil-
ity of shape and form, and can utilize a standard module to generate
flat grids, barrel vaults, domes, and free-form shapes.
Cuoco, State-ofthe-Art of Space Frame Roof Structures, in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
CIVIL ENGINEERS SYMPOSIUM ON LONG SPAN ROOF STRUCTURES 1 (Oct. 26-30,
1981).
9. Recent accident investigations have uncovered a direct correlation be-
tween high-strength steel and catastrophic failures of buildings, aircraft wings,
and other steel products. Although alloyed steel offers the engineer added
strength, durability, and cost saving over conventional steel, "[i]ts flaws are all
the more pernicious because designers specify its use in precisely those applica-
tions where the margin for error is the slimmest." High-Strength Steel Is Implicated
as Villain in Scores ofAccidents, Wall St. j., Jan. 16, 1984, at I, col. 6.
10. See Rolfe & Hall, Fracture Mechanics, Fracture Criteria, and Fracture Control
in Structures, in STRUCTURAL AND GEOTECHNICAL MECHANICS 70 (1977).
11. See id.
12. See id. at 70-71.
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affect the engineer's duties'!!' Recent advances in the under-
standing of fatigue failure,14 stress concentrations,15 and brittle
fracture 16 in steel members-the staple of most large structures-
have created new design considerations. Yet knowledge and
technology are not easily assimilated into practice,17 Determining
an engineer's liability is thus becoming more complicated, be-
cause of both this increased knowledge and the incorporation of
novel design theories into structures performing at the cutting
edge of the profession.
This article attempts to define the liability limits of structural
engineers. Part II describes the engineering field of knowledge
by way of a stratification of knowledge levels. Part III examines
the various standards of care used by appellate courts in civil
damage actions to judge an engineer's design performance. Us-
ing this framework, Part IV advocates that courts adopt a higher
standard of care, one that reflects advances in knowledge and de-
sign theory but that stops short of strict liability. Part IV con-
cludes by identifying practices and alternatives available to the
13. For a discussion of the structural design engineer's standard of care
under present law, see infra notes 69-115 and accompanying text.
14. The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) defines fatigue
as "the process of progressive localized permanent structural change occurring
in a material subjected to conditions which produce fluctuating stresses and
strain. . .and that may culminate in cracks or complete fracture after a sufficient
number of fluctuations." AMERICAN SOCIElY FOR TESTING AND MATERIALS, COM-
PILATION OF ASTM STANDARD DEFINITIONS 249 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited
as ASTM STANDARD DEFINITIONS]. In manufactured steel products, fatigue fail-
ures are the inevitable consequence of cyclical live load design stresses. The
touchstone of liability for such fatigue failures is the reasonableness of the
length of the product's service life. Allen, Fatigue Failure in Products Liability Ac-
tions, 28 ALA. L. REV. 575, 581, 584 (1977). In the area of structural design, by
contrast, fatigue failure must be prevented because of the enormous risk and
capital investment involved in a building collapse.
15. Stress concentration is defined as
[a] condition in which a stress distribution has high localized stresses.
A stress concentration is usually induced by an abrupt change in shape
of a member. In the vicinity of notches, holes, changes in diameter of a
shaft, or application points of concentrated loads, maximum stress is
several times greater than where there is no geometrical discontinuity.
13 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 219 (5th ed. 1982). Local stress
concentration "may be due to poorly made welds, small holes, and rough or
damaged edges resulting from the fabrication processes of shearing, punching,
or poor-quality oxygen cutting." B. JOHNSTON, F. LIN & T. GALAMBOS, BASIC
STEEL DESIGN 33 (2d ed. 1980).
16. A brittle fracture occurs when a structural member fractures perpendic-
ular to the direction of loading without obvious, uniform cold drawing. ASTM
STANDARD DEFINITIONS, supra note 14, at 78.
17. For a discussion of how new research, knowledge, and technological
advances are assimilated into the structured design engineering process, see in-
fra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
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engineer to limit his liability exposure and to reduce the risk of
catastrophic structural failures.
II. THE STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING STATE OF THE ART
An engineer's level of skill depends upon his training, experi-
ence, and savvy. The gamut of expertise held by members of the
profession extends from that of a new structural engineering
graduate, to that of a newly-certified professional, to that pos-
sessed by a venerable pro with thirty years of experience. The law
of structural engineering liability, however, is not dearly de-
fined-at least not as dearly defined as products liability law. In
products liability, a product not designed to the "state of the
art"18 can create liability for its manufacturer. 19 No such parallel
state of the art for engineers exists. Rather, the law has protected
structural engineers who have designed at the minimum profes-
sional level of competence but not necessarily at the state of the
art.20 If our proposed new standard of care were accepted,21
18. See Note, Products Liabilit~Strict Liabilit~Elimination of "State of the Art"
Defense, 41 TENN. L. REV. 357 (1974). "State ofthe art" is defined as the extent to
which a product could have been safely designed given the scope of knowledge
and experience of the industry at the time of manufacture and sale. [d.
19. Compliance with the state of the art standard may operate as an affirma-
tive defense. See, e.g., Moorer v. Clayton Mfg. Corp., 128 Ariz. 565, 569, 627
P.2d 716, 720 (1980) (noting Arizona statute that allows the state of the art de-
fense in product liability cases), mt. denied, 454 U.S. 866 (1981); Heath v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512,530,464 A.2d 288, 299 (1983) (recognizing an
affirmative defense to product liability actions based on discoverability of the
risk as measured by the state of the art at the time of distribution or sale); Day v.
Barber-Coleman Co., 10 III. App. 2d 494, 508-10, 135 N.E.2d 231, 238-39
(1956) (permitting state of the art defense, including consideration of reasona-
bleness of defendant's design choice, in a negligence action against a manufac-
turer for defective design of an overhead vertical door).
In some jurisdictions, compliance with the state of the art may be offered
only as evidence of the defendant manufacturer's reasonableness in the design
and manufacture of its product. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co.,
456 F. Supp. 1014, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (adherence to the usual practice of an
industry is not, in itself, a complete defense to a charge of negligence); Gel-
sumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 10 III. App. 3d 604, 608, 295 N.E.2d 110, 113 (1973)
(evidence of conformity to the state of the art is not conclusive as to nonnegli-
gence, but may be considered along with other evidence in determining reason-
ableness of defendant's conduct).
Determination of the state of the art is a question of fact and is proven by
expert testimony at trial. See Chown v. U.S.M. Corp., 297 N.W.2d 218, 222
(Iowa 1980); Chandler v. Neosho Memorial Hospital, 223 Kan. I, 5, 574 P.2d
136, 139 (1977); Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 204 Neb. 468, 478,283 N.W.2d 25, 35
(1979). Few reported appellate decisions have attempted to define state of the
art in either strict liability or negligence actions based on defective products. See
Note, supra note 18, at 357-59. For a further discussion of state of the art in
products cases, see infra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 69-115 and accompanying text.
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courts would have to take steps to define the structural engineer-
ing state of the art. A brief examination of the state of the art in
products cases will be helpful to the process of formulating a defi-
nition for structural engineers.
A. State of the Art in Products Cases
State of the art originated as a defense to negligence claims
founded on defective products.22 If the manufacturer's product
design conformed to the industry standard, the manufacturer
could escape liability for injuries sustained from use of the
product.23
The advent of strict products liability diminished the role of
the state of the art definition. Under the theory of strict liability
defined in section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts, a
manufacturer is liable for injuries caused by his product if the
product is both defective and unreasonably dangerous.24 This
rule implicitly creates a high standard of care because compliance
with industry custom, in and of itself, is inadequate to avoid
21. See infra notes 135-52 and accompanying text.
22. See Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 494, 135 N.E.2d 231
(1956). In Day, the Illinois Court of Appeals articulated its standard and ration-
ale for the state of the art defense as follows:
[I]t is not of itself negligence to use a particular design or method in
the manufacture or handling of a product or doing a job which is rea-
sonably safe and in customary use in the industry, although other possi-
ble designs, whether in use in the industry or not, might be conceived
which would be safer, and evidence as to what is thought by some to be
a safer design or method or product is not admissible.
/d. at 508, 135 N.E.2d at 238. See also Olson v. Arctic Enters., 349 F. Supp. 761
(D.N.D. 1972) (permitting state of the art defense in a negligent design action
against a snowmobile manufacturer).
23. See Comment, The State of the Art Defense in Strict Products Liability, 57
MARQ.. L. REV. 649 (1974).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A pro-
vides as follows:
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to lia-
bility for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling ~uch a product,
and
(b) it is expected tb and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
[d.
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liability.25
Nonetheless, many courts continue to acknowledge the rele-
vance of state of the art in product liability actions,26 but differ in
their definition and analytical application of the term "state of the
art." Some jurisdictions define state of the art as scientific knowl-
edge at the time of manufacture or construction that can be incor-
porated into the product in an economically and practically
feasible manner.27 Under this definition, the manufacturer is held
to a higher standard than in negligence cases. Other jurisdictions
follow the negligence definition of state of the art as "conformity
with industry-wide practice," yet effectively refuse to apply this
standard by considering expert testimony as to whether the de-
sign was reasonable.28 Still other courts, while focusing on
whether a risk of harm from use of a product is unreasonable,
have considered factors such as the availability, cost, practicality,
and technological feasibility of alternative designs to establish the
state of the art.29 Recently, some courts have even injected rea-
sonableness into the equation by holding that the law does not
require manufacturers to be prescient, to recognize and utilize all
art and science everywhere, or to create the ultimate in design
and safety.30
25. See, e.g., Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102,450 N.E.2d
204,463 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1983). But see Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d
871 (Alaska 1979); Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 10111. App. 3d 604,295 N.E.2d
110 (1973).
26. See O'Donnell, Design Litigation and the State of the Art: Technology, Practice
and Reform, 11 AKRON L. REV. 627 (1977-78) (citing Spurlin v. General Motors
Corp., 528 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1976); Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d
1196 (8th Cir. 1973); Schneider v. Chrysler Motors Co., 401 F.2d 549 (8th Cir.
1968); Holmgren v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 910 (D.N.D. 1974)
(other citations omitted); Raleigh, The "State of the Art" in Product Liability: A New
Look at an "Old" Defense, 4 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 249 (1977); Strict Products Liability
and State of the Art Evidence in Texas, 45 J. AIR. L. COM. 711 (1980).
27. See Chown v. USM Corp., 297 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Iowa 1981); Boatland
of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex. 1980).
28. See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[4][i]
(1980); Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of
Law and Technology, 12 DuQ.. L. REV. 425, 450 (1974).
29. For examples of strict liability cases in which courts have permitted con-
sideration of technical feasibility, cost, practicality, and effect on the utility ofthe
product in defining state of the art, see Raney v. Honeywell, Inc., 540 F.2d 932,
935 (8th Cir. 1976); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 887 (Alaska
1979); Kerns v. Engelek, 76 111. 2d 154, 162-63, 390 N.E.2d 859, 864 (1979);
Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 10 111. App. 3d 604, 609, 295 N.E.2d 110, 113
(1973).
30. See Mitchell v. Machinery Center, Inc., 297 F.2d 883, 886 (10th Cir.
1961); Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 20, 484 P.2d 47, 61 (1971).
But see Beshada v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 90 NJ. 191,447 A.2d 539 (1982)
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The proposed federal products liability act offers yet another
definition of the state of the art in products cases.3l The act,
which is designed to preempt all state product liability actions,32
would impose liability on manufacturers for harm caused by "un-
reasonably dangerous" products!!!! when a means to eliminate the
danger is within "practical technological feasibility. "34 The bill
defines "practical technological feasibility" as "the technical,
medical, and scientific knowledge . . . which, at the time of pro-
duction . . . was developed, available and capable of use in the
manufacture of a product, and economically feasible for use by a
manufacturer."35
B. A Practical Formulation of the State of the Art
for Structural Engineers
Although the products state of the art might be applicable by
analogy to structural failure cases, it is preferable to define a state
of the art for structural design based on the development, accept-
ance, and dissemination of new structural design theories. Four
horizons of structural engineering knowledge can and should be
identified by courts as guidelines in defining the state of the art
and in formulating an appropriate standard of care for design
professionals.36
The top stratum represents "cutting edge" research on new
hypotheses and design solutions proposed by research engineers
for professional institutes,37 university professors, and a few prac-
(holding defendant manufacturer to the level of all knowledge scientifically dis-
coverable as of the time of trial).
31. S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). See Kircher, Federal Product Legisla-
tion and Toxic Tort: The Defense Perspective, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1116 (1983); Phillips,
The Proposed Federal Product Liability Statute from the Toxic Tort Plaintiff's Perspective,
28 VILL. L. REV. 1156 (1983); Schwartz & Means, The Needfor Federal Product
Liability and Toxic Tort Legislation: A Current Assessment, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1088
(1983); Note, Proposed Federal Product Liability Legislation-A Summary and Analysis,
1 J. PROD. L. 103 (1982).
32. S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(c) (1983). The federal act would elimi-
nate all state products, negligence, and breach of express or implied warranty
actions for damages caused by a manufactured product.
33. [d. § 4(a).
34. [d. § 5(b).
35. /d. § 2(8).
36. Conversations with Stanley R. Rolfe, Ross H. Forney Distinguished
Professor of Engineering, Chairman of the Department of Civil Engineering,
University of Kansas (1983 and 1984).
37. For example, the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC), the
Concrete Reinforcing Steel Institute (CRSI), the American Society of Civil Engi-
neers (ASCE), and the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) all
participate in ongoing structural research.
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tlClng engineers. Some of this research, like the development of
the space frame, may transcend fundamental structural concepts.
Other research refines accepted principles or demonstrates the
need to consider alternative or additional design factors. This
advanced research is typically the subject of professional research
symposia, but usually would not be found in innovative structural
design.38
Once cutting edge research is proven and generally accepted
by professional associations, it becomes part of the second, "open
literature" horizon. Typically the research engineer will present a
paper formalizing his findings at a professional society meeting.
Many new theories are submitted to the American Society for
Civil Engineers (ASCE) committees, which review the underlying
research. Papers deemed worthy are then published.39 By pub-
lishing the research, the professional society impliedly gives the
findings its "stamp of approvaL"
Publication of a new proposal, however, does not yet signify
total acceptance by the profession. For this reason, professional
journals encourage, solicit, and print responses to published pa-
pers as a medium for active dialogue between researchers and
practitioners. Moreover, contrary articles may appear in the jour-
nals. It is only after a period of maturation following publication
and testing in the literature, then, that the third horizon of "pro-
fessionally accepted knowledge" arises. Proof of acceptance is in-
ferred from publication of corroborating articles as well as from
the absence of effective refutation. This third level defines the
upper limit of knowledge employed by quality structural engi-
neers who keep abreast of advances in the profession.
Finally, the fourth and bottom level of knowledge, the "un-
dergraduate" horizon, encompasses the design information nec-
essary to complete a competent (by current legal standards),
traditional structural design. Presumably, all engineers holding a
bachelor of science degree in civil engineering have a basic grasp
of statics, dynamics, strength of materials, basic design concepts,
and industry design manuals.40 They do not, however, have
38. "A construction project should not be a design professional's labora-
tory ...." Rubin & Goldberg, Foundation Failures and Rehabilitation, 3 CONSTR.
LAw. 10 (1982).
39. For examples of ASCE Publications, see CIV. ENGINEERING; J. STRUC-
TURAL ENGINEERING; J.. ENGINEERING MECHANICS; and J. CONSTRUCTION
DIVISION.
40. See AMERICAN CONCRETE INSTITUTE, ACI MANUAL OF CONCRETE PRAC-
TICE (1984); AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF STEEL CONSTRUCTION, MANUAL OF STEEL
CONSTRUCTION (8th ed. 1980); AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR TESTING & MATERIALS,
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either the actual design experience or understanding of new con-
cepts displayed by a licensed professional engineer practicing at
the forefront of available knowledge.
These four horizons illustrate the movement of a new design
concept or advance in knowledge from the time of its inception at
the cutting edge, through its publication in open literature, its ac-
ceptance by the profession, to final promulgation in design codes
and undergraduate curricula. Each state embodies successes, fail-
ures, and refinements. It is from this continuum that the crucial
legal issue flows: when in the development of structural knowl-
edge is an engineer expected to know, understand, and incorpo-
rate new design principles or methodologies into his structures?
Historically, the law has required the engineer to exercise
only "ordinary and reasonable skill usually exercised by one of
that profession" in order to avoid liability for professional negli-
gence.41 This standard, commonly known as "the professional
standard,"42 corresponds to the "custom" definition of state of
the art found in negligence-based products liability actions. It re-
quires only that the engineer use the expertise found at the un-
dergraduate horizon. Thus, the structural engineer can defend a
negligence action by proving that he designed at the level of the
average practitioner, which may only require proof that his design
incorporated industry-standard design codes and undergraduate-
level expertise. By contrast, the strict products liability definition
of state of the art would encompass all structural knowledge and
expertise practically and technically feasible for any design.
Knowledge of this sort would be drawn from the middle two hori-
zons of our scheme.
As an alternative to the foregoing, our suggested four-tiered
stratification would place the "state of the art" for the structural
engineer at the third, "professionally accepted knowledge" hori-
zon, one step up from the lowest, undergraduate level. In our
definition, state of the art incorporates scientific and engineering
advances known to result in better and safer structures. Our pro-
1984 ANNUAL BOOK OF ASTM STANDARDS; CONCRETE REINFORCING STEEL INSTI-
TUTE, CRSI HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1975).
41. Major v. Leary, 241 A.D. 606, 606, 268 NY.S. 413, 414 (1934). See
Seiler v. Levitz Furniture Co., 367 A.2d 999, 1007-08 (Del. 1976) (standard of
"reasonable and ordinary diligence"). See also Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So. 2d 56,
61 (Fla. 1973); Bodin v. Gill, 216 Ga. 467, 472, 117 S.E.2d 325, 330 (1961).
42. See J. SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING, AND THE
CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 833-38 (2d ed. 1977) (applicability of the "profes-
sional" standard of care to design professionals).
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posal would require engineers to be cognizant of, and to incorpo-
rate into their designs, advances which had reached the level of
professionally accepted knowledge. Before explaining our ration-
ale for this proposal, a general review of the context and results
of litigation against design engineers is appropriate.
III. CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST THE ENGINEER
The typical building project is initiated by a prospective
owner, who contracts with an architect for the development of the
project's design.43 The architect will then subcontract with vari-
ous specialty engineers, including the structural engineer.44 To-
gether they develop the project drawings and specifications which
form the basis for the contractor's bid for construction on an en-
tirely separate contract with the owner. The successful bidder
also subcontracts for specialty labor and materials. Thus the
owner stands at the apex of a triangular contractual relationship,
one leg of which represents the architect's design contract, and
the other leg of which represents the general contractor's con-
struction contract. In projects not involving an architect, the
structural engineer occupies the architect's position on the
triangle.45
Design-induced structural failure may result in engineer lia-
bility. The owner, with whom the engineer mayor may not be in
contractual privity, may have a cause of action to recover for eco-
nomic loss.46 An injured worker or bystander, with whom there is
clearly no contractual privity, may have a claim for economic loss
and personal injury.47 The injured party's choice of remedy will
depend on appropriate evaluation of contract law, tort law,48 and
statutes of limitations.49
43. 2 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, ARCHITECT'S HANDBOOK OF PRO-
FESSIONAL PRACTICE, Document B-141 (1977 ed.) [hereinafter cited as AlA].
44. 2 AlA, supra note 43, Document C-l41, art. 1 (1979 ed.); NATIONAL SO-
CIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS, Document 1910-10 (1980 ed.).
45. Architects usually design buildings and are not involved in bridge, off-
shore drilling rig, and television tower design.
46. For a discussion of the design engineer's potential liability to the
owner, see infra notes 50-67 and accompanying text.
47. For a discussion of the design engineer's potential liability to third par-
ties such as injured bystanders, see infra note 68 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 50-68 and accompanying text.
49. In the late 1960's, the AlA, the NSPE, and the Associated General Con-
tractors lobbied state legislatures for the enactment of special statutes of limita-
tion or repose for builders of structures on real property. See Comment, Recent
Statutory Developments Concerning the Limitations ofActions Against Architects, Engineers,
and Builders, 60 Ky. LJ. 462, 464 (1972); Comment, A Defense Catalogue for the
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A. Choice of Remedy
1. Engineer in Privity with Owner
The law is well settled that a project owner in contractual
privity with the structural engineer can sue for economic loss aris-
ing from a breach of contract.50 In order to ascertain whether
there has been such a breach, however, the factfinder must deter-
mine what the engineer was contractually obligated to do. With-
out express contractual language to guide them,51 the courts'
interpretations of the engineer's contractual duty have been "in-
fected" with a tort standard.52
Although the engineer's design responsibility arises purely as
Design Profession, 45 UMKC L. REV. 75,91-96 (1976). Forty-six state legislatures
eventually passed or amended statutes with limitations ranging from three to
twenty years, although twelve statutes were later held unconstitutional. For an
accurate accounting of the statutes and their current status, see Statutes ofLimita-
tionfor the Design Professions, AlE Legal Newsletter (V.O. Shinnerer Co. Jan. 1983
Special Supp. No.1, 3).
Special statutes of limitations for engineers, architects and builders gener-
ally run from the time of substantial completion of construction, not from final
performance of the contractual duties or the date of injury. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-80-127 (Supp. 1983) (suits against engineers and architects must
commence within two years of the time the claim arises and "in no event . . .
more than ten years after the substantial completion of the improvement").
Where traditional tort statutes apply, the statute will generally run from the date
of substantial injury. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513 (1983) (tort actions
must be brought within two years from the date of substantial injury).
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981). Section 347
embodies the accepted legal principle that a party to a contract injured as a re-
sult of a breach of the contract has a right to damages based on his expectation
interest as measured by:
(a) the loss in the value to him of the other party's performance
caused by its failure or deficiency, plus
(b) any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused
by the breach, less
(c) any cost or other loss that he has avoided by not having to
perform.
/d.
51. Although the AlA and NSPE standard contract documents between
owner and design professional carefully define those duties of the architect or
engineer, neither attempts to define the manner of performance in more than
vague terms. For example, the architect is charged with becoming "generally
familiar with the progress and quality of the [w]ork" in determining if the work
is proceeding in accordance with the contract documents. See AlA, supra note
43, Document B-141, ~ 1.5.4; NATIONAL SOCIElY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS,
Document 1910-1 ~ 1.6.2 (1979 ed.) [hereinafter cited as NSPE]. Neither con-
tract requires the professional to use standard design manuals or formulae; min-
imum competence is assumed.
52. Note, Architectural Malpractice: A Contract-Based Approach, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 1075, 1089 (1979) (citing Straus v. Buchman, 96 A.D. 270, 273, 89 N.Y.S.
226,228 (1904), affdmem., 184 N.Y. 545, 76 N.E. 1109 (1906); White v. Palley,
119 Or. 97, 99-100, 247 P. 316, 317 (1926».
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a matter of contract, a majority ofjurisdictions uphold liability in
tort for breach of a contractual duty whenever it involves a fore-
seeable, unreasonable risk of harm to the interests of the owner:53
If a defendant may be held liable for the neglect of a
duty imposed on him, independently of any contract, by
operation of law, a fortiori ought he to be held liable
when he has come under an obligation to use care as the
result of an undertaking founded on a consideration.
Where the duty has its roots in contract, the undertaking
to observe due care may be implied from the relation-
h· 54S Ip ....
Thus, the owner in privity of contract with the engineer usually
has available to him both contract and tort remedies.
2. Engineer Not in Privity with Owner
Although the owner may contract directly with the engineer,
it is more probable that he will contract with an architect and al-
low the architect to execute independent contracts with structural
and mechanical engineers as well as interior and landscaping con-
sultants.55 In such a case, the owner's lack of privity with the en-
gineer raises an impediment to actions both in contract and in
tort. Under traditional contract law, the owner, absent privity,
cannot sue for breach of contract unless he is an intended third
party beneficiary56 of the engineer's agreement with the
architect.57
53. See generally PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 92, at 55 (W.
Keeton 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER AND KEETON].
54. Flint & Walling Mfg. Co. v. Beckett, 167 Ind. 491, 498,79 N.E. 503, 505
(1906).
55. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
56. See Waterford Condominium Ass'n v. Dunbar Corp., 104 Ill. App. 3d
371,432 N.E. 2d 1009 (1982) (condominium owners who were not in privity
with the developer could not bring suit in contract or implied warranty unless
they could demonstrate that they, as subsequent purchasers, were the intended
beneficiaries of the developer's contract with the original purchaser).
The Second Restatement of Contracts defines a beneficiary of a promise as
an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the benefici-
ary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and the circumstances
indicate that the promisee (architect) intends to give the beneficiary (owner) the
benefit of the proposed performance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 302 (1981). SeealsoJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 17-2 (1982) .
. 57. Cf Holiday Dev. Co. v.J.A. Tobin Constr. Co., 219 Kan. 701, 549 P.2d
1376 (1976) (subcontractor or materialman may obtain a personal judgment
against owner where there was privity of contract or a direct promise to pay the
subcontractor in the owner's contract with the architect). See generally 4 A.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 774 (1964).
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Moreover, some courts will not recognize a tort action for
economic injury absent privity of contract.58 Although the
landmark MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 59 decision and its progeny
have abrogated the privity doctrine for personal injuries,60 most
project owners will not suffer personal injury as a result of struc-
tural failure. Thus, the owner not in privity with the engineer
might be left without a tort cause of action for negligent perform-
ance of the engineer's contractural duties.
A growing number ofjurisdictions,61 however, refuse to rec-
ognize privity as a defense to economic injury actions arising from
a design professional's conduct unless the plaintiff is beyond the
foreseeable scope of harm.62 The owner's position at the apex of
the construction project triangle clearly places him within this
58. See, e.g., Peyronnin Constr. Co. v. Weiss, 137 Ind. App. 417, 208 N.E.2d
489 (1965) (complaint by contractor against engineers for economic loss suf-
fered as a result of engineers' negligence did not state a cause of action because
the contractor failed to show a contractual relation between itself and the engi-
neers); Delta Constr. Co. v. City ofJackson, 198 So. 2d 592 (Miss. 1967) (deny-
ing recovery for economic loss in the absence of privity of contract).
59.217 N.Y. 382, III N.E. 1050 (1916).
60. See Montijo v. Swift, 219 Cal. App. 2d 351, 353, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133, 134-
35 (1963) (privity of contract not required in an action to recover damages for
physical injuries); Paxton v. Alameda County, 119 Cal. App. 2d 393, 259 P.2d
934 (1953) (without discussing issue, court affirmed recovery for injuries despite
lack of privity); Inman v. Binghamton Hous. Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 144, 164
N.Y.S.2d 699,703, 143 N.E.2d 895,898-99 (1957) (those who plan and build a
defective improvement on real estate are liable for physical injuries resulting
from the defect, regardless of privity of contract). See generaLLy Note, Liability of
Architects and Engineers to Third Parties: A New Approach. 53 NOTRE DAME LAw. 306.
307-09 (1977).
61. E.C. Ernst. Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 551 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir.) (ar-
chitect liable for economic injury to contractor), reh'g denied in part and granted in
part, 559 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978); Detweiler
Bros., Inc. v.John Graham & Co., 412 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Wash. 1976) (privity of
contract not necessary in order for contractor to maintain a tort action against
architect); Cooper v. Jeune, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976)
(right of recovery against negligent architect by those not in privity of contract
with him extends to economic loss); A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397
(Fla. 1973) (third party general contractor has right of recovery in tort against
architect or engineer despite lack of privity); Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 95 Ill.
App. 3d 444, 420 N.E.2d 209 (1981), ajf'dinpart, 92 Ill. 2d 171,441 N.E.2d 324
(1982) (builder liable to subsequent purchasers for economic loss resulting from
latent defects in construction); Kristek v. Catron. 7 Kan. App. 2d 495. 644 P.2d
480 (1982) (purchaser of a residence may recover damages for economic loss
caused by negligence of builder despite lack of privity); Craig v. Everett M.
Brooks Co., 351 Mass. 497, 222 N.E.2d 752 (1967) (privity is not a requirement
for recovery for economic loss caused by contractor's negligence in performing
his duty); McMillan v. Brune-Harpenau-Torbeck Builders, 8 Ohio St. 3d 3, 455
N.E.2d 1276 (1983) (privity of contract is not a necessary element in negligence
action for economic injury).
62. See J. SWEET, supra note 42, at 730.
1985] ENGINEERS' LIABILIlY 417
scope, thus providing a negligence cause of action for personal
and economic injury in some states.
In most suits against structural engineers, a tort remedy will
be more advantageous to the injured owner than a contract rem-
edy. Under the widely accepted rule of Hadley v. Baxendale,63 con-
tract damages are limited to those that are foreseeable, either
because the result followed in the ordinary course of events or
because the party had reason to know of the result at the time the
contract was formed.64 Thus, whether reconstruction costs and
loss of use of the property are recoverable under a contract de-
pends upon whether they are foreseeable.65 By contrast, in tort
the owner may recover all damages proximately caused by the
tortfeasor's negligence66 and sometimes even punitive damages
are awarded.67
3. Injured Workers and Bystanders
The employee of the contractor or subcontractor injured
during construction, the tea dance participant paralyzed by a fail-
ing skywalk, the professional hockey team relocated from a dam-
aged municipal arena, or the corner business showered by a
skyscraper's glass might sue the structural engineer but would
have no option but to proceed in tort. Absence of privity with the
engineer will bar most contract suits68 and possibly some negli-
63. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 351 (1981) (adopting Hadley v. B(J)Cendale's forseeability limitation).
64. 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
65. See English Village Properties, Inc. v. Boettcher & Lieurance Constr.
Co., 7 Kan. App. 2d 307, 316, 640 P.2d 1282, 1290 (1982) (the cost of repair
rule is the proper measure of damages). See generally 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 57,
§ 1007 (1964); Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 917, 918 (1966). Punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of con-
tract. Kemper v. Rohrich, 508 F. Supp. 444, 449 (D. Kan. 1980). See 5 A.
CORBIN, supra note 57, § 1077, at 438.
66. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 426 P.2d
173 (1967) (injured party may recover all damages proximately caused by a de-
fendant's conduct, whether or not the damages were foreseeable or anticipated);
Enlow v. Hawkins, 71 Kan. 633, 81 P. 189 (1905) (tortfeasor liable for all dam-
ages which are natural and probable results of his conduct). See generally PROS-
SER AND KEETON, supra note 53, § 41.
67. Generally, only a finding of willful, wanton, or reckless conduct will jus-
tify an award of punitive damages in tort actions. Atkinson v. Orkin Exterminat-
ing Co., 5 Kan. App. 2d 739, 747,625 P.2d 505, 511 (not a construction case),
ajJ'd, 230 Kan. 277, 634 P.2d 1071 (1981). See generally PROSSER AND KEETON,
supra note 53, § 2.
68. The injured worker might want to proceed against the engineer be-
cause workers' compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy against his em-
ployer/contractor. Recent amendments to some state workers' compensation
statutes bar an action against design professionals for injuries on the construc-
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gence actions for economic injuries where the plaintiffs harm is
outside the scope of foreseeable damage and only weakly con-
nected to the structural failure. Like the owner, however, the in-
jured worker or bystander can generally maintain a cause of
action in tort for personal injuries.
B. The Engineer's Standard of Care
Unless the engineer's professional services contract with the
owner or architect establishes a minimum measure of perform-
ance,69 the law imposes the same standard of care in both con-
tract and tort actions; judicial deference towards professionals
interjects a tort standard of care into the contract interpreta-
tion.70 Four distinct measures of the engineer's implied standard
of care have evolved, three by judicial definition and one by regu-
latory action.
1. The Professional Malpractice Standard
The seiminal American case, Coombs v. Beede,71 established
the early standard of care for architects:
The undertaking of an architect implies that he pos-
sesses the skill and ability. . . sufficient to enable him to
perform the required services at least ordinarily and rea-
sonably well . . . . But the undertaking does not imply
or warrant a satisfactory result. . . . An error ofjudge-
ment is not necessarily evidence of a want of skill or care,
for mistakes and miscalculations are incident to all the
business of life.72
The Second Restatement of Torts incorporates the Coombs state-
ment into its general standard for all professions, including
engmeers:
Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or
knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the
tion site unless responsibility for safety is specifically assumed by contract or the
injury is caused by negligent preparation of design plans or specifications. See
Kansas H.B. 2084 (1985) (amending KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-501,-508 (1981 and
Supp. 1984»; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 12 (West Supp. 1984).
69. See supra note 51.
70. See supr" notes 51-52 and infra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
71. 89 Me. 187, 36 A. 104 (1896).
72. /d. at 188-89, 36 A. at 105. See also T. CLARK, ARCHITECT, OWNER AND
BUILDER BEFORE THE LAw 28 (1905);]. WAIT, ENGINEERING AND ARCHITECTURAL
JURISPRUDENCE 751 (1898).
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practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise
the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members
of that profession or trade in good standing in similar
communities.73
This standard includes the "performance of skills necessary in
coping with engineering and construction problems" outside the
knowledge of ordinary laymen.74 It does not, however, set the
standard at either the level of the most highly skilled or even the
average practitioner, since those below the average may be com-
petent and qualified nonetheless.75
Although a majority ofjurisdictions have clearly adopted this
"professional" standard for architects and engineers,76 only a
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
74. Bartak v. Bell-Galyardt & Wells, Inc., 629 F.2d 523, 529 (8th Cir. 1980).
See also Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, 392 F.2d 472,477 (8th
Cir. 1968).
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A comment e (1965). The
Restatement drafters emphasized that competence was the critical factor.
In the absence of any such special representation, the standard of skill
and knowledge required of the actor who practices a profession or
trade is that which is commonly possessed by members of that profes-
sion or trade in good standing. It is not that of the most highly skilled,
nor is it that of the average member of the profession or trade, since
those who have less than median or average skill may still be competent
and qualified.
[d.
76. See, e.g., Bartak v. Bell-Galyardt & Wells, Inc., 629 F.2d 523, 529 (8th
Cir. 1980) (standard of care for architects is similar to that for other profession-
als); General Trading Corp. v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 523 F.2d 98, 101 (3d Cir.
1975) (standard of reasonable care which applies to architects is the same as the
standard which applies to other professionals who furnish skilled services for
compensation); Kama v. Byron Reed Syndicate, #4, 374 F. Supp. 687, 689 (D.
Neb. 1974) (architect's duty is to exercise care ordinarily exercised by members
of his profession); Huber, Hunt & Nicols, Inc. v. Moore, 67 Cal. App. 3d 278,
313, 136 Cal. Rptr. 603, 625 (1977) (architect is required to perform in accord-
ance with a professional standard of care); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655
P.2d 822, 828 (Colo. 1982) (architect's inspection, supervision and observation
of construction involve individual judgment and expertise, which is not suscepti-
ble to the quality control standards of a factory); Seiler v. Levitz Furniture Co.,
367 A.2d 999, 1007-08 (Del. 1976) (standard of care applicable to professional
persons providing services is also applicable to architects and engineers); Morri-·
son v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 560-61 (D.C. 1979) (one who has special
knowledge or skills is required to exercise his superior ability in a manner rea-
sonable under the circumstances); Shepard v. City of Palatka, 414 So. 2d 1077,
1078 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (engineers and architects are to exercise their
professional skill and judgment in a reasonable manner and without neglect); H.
Elton Thompson & Assocs. v. Williams, 164 Ga. App. 571, 572, 298 S.E.2d 539,
540 (1982) (professionals are obligated to exercise a reasonable degree of care,
skill, and ability as is ordinarily exercised by their profession); Lukowski v. Vecta
Educ. Corp., 401 N.E.2d 781, 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (architect required to
exercise his special skill and knowledge and use his best professional judgment);
Schlitz v. Cullen-Schlitz & Assocs., 228 N.W.2d 10, 17 (Iowa 1975) (architect
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handful have adhered to the Restatement's locality rule. 77 The
Restatement compares the engineer's performance with that of
others in similar "communities," leading to the conclusion that a
New York City engineer could be held to a standard different
from that of a Lawrence, Kansas, engineer.78 Judicial reluctance
to adopt the locality rule may be due to a desire to apply a na-
tional standard when appropriate and to the difficulty of finding
competent expert witnesses from a similar practice in a similar
locality.79
Few appellate courts have identified probative evidence for
obligated to furnish design and specifications prepared with a reasonable degree
of technical skill); Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 715,437 N.E.2d 514,525
(1982) (architect does not impliedly guarantee his work is fit for its intended
purpose, but rather that he has exercised the level of skill and care required of a
member of his profession); Tiffany v. Christman Co., 93 Mich. App. 267, 286,
287 N.W.2d 199,207 (1979) (architects and engineers held to the level ofordi-
nary skill and care common to their professions); City of Eveleth v. Ruble, 302
Minn. 249, 253, 225 N.W.2d 521,524-25 (1974) (professional is under a duty to
exercise such care, skill, and diligence as others in his profession ordinarily exer-
cise under like circumstances); State ex rel. Risk Management Div. of Dep't. of
Fin. & Admin. v. Gathman-Matotan Architects & Planners, Inc., 98 N.M. 790,
792-93,653 P.2d 166, 169 (1982) (professional required to exercise the reason-
able skills of his profession); Van Ornum v. Otter Tail Power Co., 210 N.W.2d
188,201 (N.D. 1973) (architect obligated to exercise the level of learning, skill
and care ordinarily exercised by others of his profession); Waggoner v. W & W
Steel Co., 657 P.2d 147, 149 (Okla. 1982) (architect does not guarantee perfect
results, but rather is liable only for failure to exercise reasonable care and pro-
fessional skill); Surf Realty Corp. v. Standing, 195 Va. 431, 442-43, 78 S.E.2d
901, 907 (1953) (architect must possess and exercise the degree of care of those
ordinarily skilled in his profession); Hull v. Enger Constr. CO.,15 Wash. App.
511,515,550 P.2d 692, 695 (1976) (architect held to a professional standard of
care); A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, 62 Wis. 2d 479, 488-89, 214 N.W.2d 764,
769 (1974) (architect's duty is to exercise the level of care ordinarily exercised
by members of his profession). See also Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 186
Conn. 370, 381, 441 A.2d 620, 626 (1982) (a builder is under a duty to exercise
that degree of care which a skilled builder of ordinary prudence would have
exercised).
77. See, e.g., Clark v. City of Seward, 659 P.2d 1227, 1230 (Alaska 1983)
(engineer has duty to exercise that degree of learning and skill ordinarily pos-
sessed by engineers practicing in the same locality and under similar circum-
stances); Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher & Assocs., 24 Utah 2d 172, 179, 467
P.2d 610, 615 (1970) (architects held to the standard of care possessed by archi-
tects in their locality). See also Seaman Unified Sch. Dist. No. 345 v. Casson Con-
str. Co., 3 Kan. App. 2d 289, 292-95, 594 P.2d 241, 245 (1979) (applying a
community standard to determine whether expert testimony is required). But see
Paxton v. County of Alameda, 119 Cal. App. 2d 393, 406, 259 P.2d 934, 942
(1953) (deviation from the practice normally followed in a community does not
necessarily indicate negligence).
78. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
79. See Swan v. Lamb, 584 P.2d 814 (Utah 1978). In this medical malprac-
tice action, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a trial court's refusal to admit
expert testimony on a national standard of care. Id. at 818. The concurring
judge stated that if the critical issue in a case relates to a generally known and
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defining the engineer's standard of care. In Burran v. Dambold,80
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit established one litmus paper test by holding that a structural
engineer's failure to design reinforced concrete picnic shelters in
compliance with the New Mexico state building code constituted
negligence per se.81 Under Burran, then, evidence of a violation of
a state statute or municipal ordinance may entitle the plaintiff to a
directed verdict without consideration of the standard of care.82
By contrast, the violation of a private safety code or design man-
ual, such as the National Fire Code or National Electric Code, is
admissible but not conclusive evidence of negligence.83 Despite
its advantage of predictability, the Burran rule establishes a rela-
tively low standard of care since design codes often run five to
seven years behind the publication of new knowledge.
2. An Intermediate Standard-Duty to Stay Informed
Several courts, either in direct holdings or dicta, have hinted
at a higher standard of care for professionals than that of the Re-
statement by requiring consideration of advances in the profes-
sion.84 First suggested in a medical malpractice case in 1853,85
accepted practice, then a "national" standard can be properly applied. [d. at
818-19 (Crockett, j., concurring specially).
80. 422 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1970) (applying New Mexico law).
81. [d. at 135.
82. /d. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 53, § 36. See also Henry v. Britt,
220 So. 2d 917, 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (evidence of violation of a statute con-
stituted prima facie evidence of negligence), cert. denied, 229 So. 2d 867 (Fla.
1969). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965).
83. Evans v. Howard R. Green Co., 231 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Iowa 1975).
84. See, e.g., Miller v. DeWitt, 59 Ill. App. 2d 38, III, 208 N.E.2d 249, 284
(1965), modified, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967) (architect must "keep
abreast of the improvements of the times"); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102,
109, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1968) (requiring physician to "tak[e] into account the
advances in the profession"); Hansen v. Pock, 57 Mont. 51, 58-59, 187 P. 282,
284 (1920) (physician must recognize and use "the condition of medical or sur-
gical science" at the time); Banner v. Town of Dayton, 474 P.2d 300, 307-08
(Wyo. 1970) (engineer required to be familiar with Current developments in his
field). See also National Cash Register Co. v. Haak, 233 Pa. Super. 562, 335 A.2d
407 (1975). In deciding the negligence of an architect for faulty design of dry
wells, the appellate court in Haak reversed to allow a geology professor to testify
that none of the professor's geologist colleagues, either at the college or else-
where, would have designed the well system as the architect had, and that he
knew this from discussions at meetings with those colleagues. [d. at 574, 335
A.2d at 412.
85. McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. 261 (1853) (mandating consideration of
"the advanced state of the profession at the time" in determining the degree of
skill to which a physician should be held). Expanding on the idea of a physi-
cian's duty to stay current, the McCandless court observed:
Discoveries in the natural sciences for the last half-century have exerted
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and repeated in cases concerning malpractice of physicians who
failed to use X-rays for diagnoses,86 the notion of a duty to stay
informed has also appeared in a few engineering liability cases.
For example, in Chapel v. Clark,87 the architect brought suit to re-
cover professional fees, and the owner counterclaimed for addi-
tional construction costs incurred because of the architect's errors
or omissions.88 The Michigan Supreme Court refused to impose
an implied warranty on the architect's work and held only that
"[t]he law requires the exercise of ordinary skill and care, in the
light of present knowledge."89
Similarly, the Wyoming Supreme Court, in Banner v. Town of
Dayton,90 fully reviewed both the standard of care and the suffi-
ciency of evidence in reversing a summary judgment in favor of a
consulting engineer. The city had hired the engineer to design
and supervise installation of a new city water main. The main
subsequently developed numerous leaks from electrolysis-in-
duced corrosion.91 The supreme court, finding that electrolysis
was a "common subject of discussion among the profession at the
time" as evidenced by articles in professionaljournals,92 held that
the engineer failed to meet the minimum standard of care.93
This higher standard recognizes sub silentio Judge Learned
Hand's reasoning in The T.]. Hooper,94 in which the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held tugboat owners lia-
ble for losses incurred during a storm because the tugs were not
equipped with radios that would have warned against the impend-
a sensible influence on all the learned professions, but especially on
that of medicine, whose circle of truths has been relatively much en-
larged. And besides, there has been a positive progress in that profes-
sion resulting from the studies, the experiments, and the diversified
practice of its professors. The patient is entitled to the benefit of these
increased lights. The physician or surgeon who assumes to exercise the
healing art, is bound to be up to the improvements of the day. The
standard of ordinary skill is on the advance; and he who would not be
found wanting, must apply himself with all diligence to the most ac-
credited sources of knowledge.
[d. at 269.
86. For citations to these cases and a comprehensive discussion of the duty
to stay informed in medical malpractice cases, see McCoid, The Care Required of
Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 575-81 (1959).
. 87. 117 Mich. 638, 76 N.W. 62 (1898).
88. /d. at 638-39, 76 N.W. at 62.
89. [d. at 640, 76 N.W. at 62 (emphasis added).
90. 474 P.2d 300 (Wyo. 1970).
91. [d. at 301.
92. /d. at 307 n.7.
93. [d. at 308.
94. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
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ing storm.95 Noting that an entire profession cannot hide behind
"customary" but negligent practices,96 Judge Hand wrote that
[t]here are, no doubt, cases where courts seem to make
the general practice of the calling the standard of proper
diligence . . . . Indeed in most cases reasonable pru-
dence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never
its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in
the adoption of new and available devices. . . . [T]here
are precautions so imperative that even their universal
disregard will not excuse their omission.97
3. A Strict Liability Standard
Strict liability provides a second alternative to the "profes-
sional" standard of care for structural engineers. Injured owners
or third parties could conceivably recover under two strict liability
theories: (1) a products liability claim based on a defective condi-
tion in the structure; or (2) a warranty claim based on representa-
tions made by the engineer. Few courts, however, have allowed
recovery against design professionals under either theory.
Strict liability for defective products imposes liability on
"sellers" of "products" without fault.98 Under section 402A of
the Second Restatement of Torts, the injured party need only es-
tablish that the product exhibits a condition of safety below that
imposed by operation of law and that it was expected to and did
reach the consumer substantially unchanged.99 It makes no differ-
ence that the seller exercised all possible care in preparing the
product. tOO In the construction context, the application of this
theory could raise the specter of liability of the structural engi-
neer in two ways, assuming that an engineer sells some finished
product.
First, if the structural engineer's "product" is the finished
building, then he would be liable to the owner for any injury
caused by either design or construction errors. The complexity
of building projects, the sheer number of construction partici-
95. /d. at 739-40.
96. Id. at 740.
97. Id. (citations omitted).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). For a discussion of
§ 402A and strict liability in products cases, see supra notes 24-30 and accompa-
nying text.
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
100. See id. Section 402A focuses on the safety of the product, not on the
conduct of the manufacturer.
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pants, and the inherent inability of the engineer to control the
construction progress militate against such a broad definition of
product. By contrast, if the engineer's "product" is a completed
design embodied in drawings and specifications, he could be
strictly liable for all injury or loss caused by design error, absent
superseding acts of negligence by the general contractor or sub-
contractors. 101 Under this theory, even if the engineer uses state
of the art design knowledge, he could be liable if the structure
fails on account of design error. 102
Despite the intuitive appeal to the public of the products lia-
bility approach, courts have unanimously refused to apply the
. doctrine to engineers l03 unless the engineer participates in the
assembly or manufacture of a structure or building compo-
nent. 104 Courts have recognized that owners or architects hire
engineers to provide services, not insurance on the exercise of
their professional judgments. 105
101. See Comment, Architect Tort Liability in Preparation of Plans and Specifica-
tions, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1361, 1380 (1967).
102. For example, a design engineer could be strictly liable for the collapse
of a novel 1250 foot cylindrical television tower where the design undertaken
was "beyond the frontiers of knowledge." See Stanton & Dugdale, Design Respon-
sibility in Civil Engineering Work, 131 NEW LJ. 583,585 (1981). Such a case oc-
curred in England where the collapse was due to icing of the stay ropes and
"vortex shedding," which is air turbulence creating random pressure on the
structure. The unreported opinion of the House of Lords is described in the
Stanton and Dugdale article.
103. See, e.g., LaRossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 941-43 (3d
Cir. 1968) (distinguishing professional services from consumer goods and refus-
ing to apply strict liability standards to the former on policy grounds); K-Mart
Corp. v. Midcon Realty Group, Ltd., 489 F. Supp. 813, 819 (D. Conn. 1980)
(doctrine of strict liability does not extend to design and development of build-
ings); Swett v. Gribaldo,jones & Assocs., 40 Cal. App. 3d 573, 575-76, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 99, 101 (1974) (engineers not liable in the absence of negligence or inten-
tional conduct); Castaldo v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 376 A.2d 88, 90-
91 (Del. 1977) (strict tort liability not imposed against defendants who have pro-
vided only professional services); City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d
420, 424-25 (Minn. 1978) (architectural errors better handled under a cause of
action for professional negligence rather than strict liability); Queensbury Union
Free Sch. Dist. v.jim Walter Corp., 91 Mise. 2d 804, 398 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct.
1977) (no action in strict liability for damages resulting from an architect's
services).
104. See Abdul-Warith v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 488 F. Supp. 306, 310-11
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (engineering firm both designed and built skip bridgefor steel
blast furnace), ajf'd mem., 642 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1981).
105. See Swett v. Gribaldo, jones & Assocs., 40 Cal. App. 3d 573, 576, 115
Cal. Rptr. 99, 101 (1974); Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 489,275 P.2d 15,
21 (1954) ("Those who hire [experts] are not justified in expecting infallibility,
but can expect only reasonable care and competence. They purchase service,
not insurance."). But see Comment, supra note 101, at 1386 (most building own-
ers simply "assume that the architect's plans will not be defective," and "[t]he
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The second basis for strict liability could arise from an engi-
neer's express or implied representations that the structure will
be fit for its intended purpose. Although the implied warranty
action has gained support as an additional form of consumer pro-
tection in residential construction,106 very few courts have al-
lowed the doctrine to operate absent the engineer's actual
knowledge of unique performance criteria. For example, in
Bloomsburg Mills, Inc. v. Sardoni Construction Co. ,107 the contract be-
tween the owner and architect specified temperature and high hu-
midity requirements necessary to the owner's weaving
business. l08 The architect specified a built-up roof with a vapor
barrier to protect against roof-surface condensation, but the bar-
rier failed and the roof had to be replaced. l09 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, while expressly adopting the professional stan-
dard, stated: "While an architect is not an absolute insurer of
perfect plans, he is called upon to prepare plans and specifica-
tions which will give the structure so designed reasonable fitness
for its intended use, and he impliedly warrants their sufficiency
for that purpose."110 The implied warranty theory could bode an
ominous standard for design-build projects,lll where in-house
"professional" engineering work merges with construction into a
finished product.
4. A Regulatory Standard-Gross Negligence
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has promul-
law should protect those 'thoughtless' clients from their own lack of foresight"
by imposing strict liability on the design professional).
106. See Kristek v. Catron, 7 Kan. App. 2d 495,644 P.2d 480 (1982) (pur-
chaser of a residence may recover property damage resulting from builder's con-
duct under theory of implied warranty); Weeks v. Slavik Builders, Inc., 24 Mich.
App. 621,180 N.W.2d 503 (implied warranty of fitness for use extends to pur-
chaser of a new residential dwelling), ajfd, 384 Mich. 257, 181 N.W.2d 271
(1970); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 NJ. 70,207 A.2d 314 (1965) (plaintiff
asserting claim against builder of residential dwelling on theory of implied war-
ranty has burden of proving existence of a defect at the time of sale).
107. 401 Pa. 358, 164 A.2d 201 (1960).
108. Id. at 359, 164 A.2d at 202.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 361-62, 164 A.2d at 203. See also Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260
Iowa 453, 460, 150 N.W.2d 94, 99 (1967) (architect bound to produce a build-
ing of the kind called for, without marked defects in character, strength, or ap-
pearance); Tamarac Dev. Co. v. Delamater, Freund & Assocs., 234 Kan. 618,
622-23, 576 P.2d 361, 365 (1984) (duty of architect "gives rise to an implied
warranty of workmanlike performance").
Ill. See J. SWEET, supra note 42, at 700 ("[S]ometimes design and construc-
tion are combined. This can be accomplished by a large firm which supplies
both functions.").
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gated regulations that establish a special federal standard of care
for consulting engineers on new waste water treatment plant
funded under the Clean Water ACt. 1l2 The EPA encourages own-
ers to incorporate new "innovative" methods of sewage treatment
in EPA-funded plants. llll In return, the consulting design engi-
neers are given contractual immunity from liability for innovative
designs in the absence of gross negligence. I14 This lower stan-
dard has not been adopted in other agency design contracts and
remains an unlikely candidate for projects involving great safety
risks to the public.I 15
IV. DEFINING AN ApPROPRIATE STANDARD OF CARE
Identification of the four horizons of engineering design
knowledge and information prompts the pressing question of
whether the courts are applying the appropriate standard of care
to engineers. As Judge Hand recognized in The TJ. Hooper, courts
will not permit an entire profession to absolve itself from liability
by adopting negligent methods as its industry standard. I16 Cer-
tainly no American court has gone as far toward immunizing the
engineer as one English court did in 1853:
[I]f the building is of an ordinary description, in which
[the engineer] has had abundance of experience, and it
proved a failure, this is evidence of want of skill or atten-
tion. But if the building is out of the ordinary course,
and you employ him about a novel thing, . . . if it has
not had the test of experience,jailure may be consistent with
skill. I I'
A court's choice between strict liability and liability based on the
engineer's negligence reflects a decision to evaluate either the fin-
112. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). The act authorizes the EPA to fi-
nance construction of waste treatment works, and to promulgate standards for
their construction. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.900-.970 (1982).
113. 40 C.F.R. § 35.908(a) (1983).
114. 40 C.F.R. § 35.900 app. C-l § 2(d) (1983). This immunity extends
only to the use of innovative processes or techniques, not to standard design
and construction processes. Id.
115. See Clovis Heinsath & Assocs., NASA B.C.A. No. 180-1 11 16,133
(1983) (adopting the "locality" rule, a standard different from the innovative
design immunity proposed by the EPA for an engineering design error case).
116. For a discussion of the HoOper decision, see supra notes 94-97 and ac-
companying text.
117. Turner v. Garland & Christopher, 2 Hudson's B.C. 127 (1853), quoted
in W. BALL, THE LAw AFFECTING ENGINEERS 53 (1909) (emphasis added).
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ished product or the process employed in the design. lIB The fol-
lowing discussion suggests a rationale for adopting a negligence
theory of liability for engineers and proposes an appropriate stan-
dard of care.
A. A Rejection of Strict Liability
Despite the forceful arguments of two student commenta-
tors, 119 courts have correctly refused to apply either absolute or
strict liability to design professionals. 120 Both legal and policy ar-
guments support this position. First, a supplier of services is ex-
pressly outside the scope of section 402A.121 Even those courts
that recognize strict liability in the residential construction con-
text, thus blurring the fine line between buildings and consumer
products, continue to distinguish the engineer's service contract
from the design-build contract. 122 Second, a negligence standard
is more consistent with the reasonable expectations of the owner
and engineer because of the engineer's inherent inability to con-
trol the.entire construction process. 123 By contrast, an automo-
bile manufacturer typically has absolute control of the component
assembly process from frame to custom interior.
Third, the policy bases underlying strict products liability
generally do not apply to structural engineers. For example, the
product owner's difficulty in proving a manufacturer's negligent
design of a mass-produced product is not present when a single
structural engineering firm designs a single structure for a known
118. See J. SWEET, supra note 42, at 111-12.
119. Comment, supra note 101 at 1379-91 (current means of shifting risk of
loss, such as contractual arrangements or insurance, are inadequate to protect
the rights of .he injured); Note, Products and the Professional: Strict Liability in the
Sale-Service Hybrid Transaction, 24 HASTINGS LJ. Ill, 129·131 (1972) (advocating
strict liability in hybrid transactions as a way of balancing the tremendous bene-
fits which accrue to professionals against their responsibility to those harmed by
their failure to perform).
120. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text. In the construction
context, absolute liability would render an engineer liable for any structural fail-
ure, even one caused by the negligence of a third party-like a steel erector
leaving a critical connection unbolted. By contrast, the erector's intervening act
would supersede an engineer's liability under a general products liability theory.
See generally PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 53, § 102.
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comments e & f (1965). See
Abdul-Warith v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 488 F. Supp. 306, 310 & n.3 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (§ 402A does not extend to parties who provide only services), a./fd mem.,
642 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1981).
122. For an explanation of the design-build contract, see supra note III
and accompanying text.
123. See Note, Liability ofDesign Professionals-The Necessity ofFault, 58 IOWA L.
REV. 1221, 1246 (1978).
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owner. Similarly, although the threat of strict products liability
may encourage manufacturers of mass-produced products to de-
velop safer manufacturing processes, it has little effect on an engi-
neer with no direct control over fabrication and construction
methods. 124 Too, products liability's policy of spreading the risk
of injuries among numerous purchasers by incremental additions
to product costs is inappropriate in the structural engineering
context. As one court observed:
If every facet of structural design consisted of little more
than the mechanical application of immutable physical
principles, we could accept the rule of strict liability
which the city proposes. But even in the present state of
relative technological enlightenment, the keenest engi-
neering minds can 'err in their most searching assess-
ment of the natural factors which determine whether
structural components will adequately serve their in-
tended purpose. Until the random element is eliminated
in the application of architectural sciences, we think it
fairer that the purchaser of the architect's services bear
the risk of such unforeseeable difficulties. 125
Although the owner may be strictly liable for defects in his build-
ing premises,126 he also gets the direct benefits of the building.
The engineer does not have numerous purchasers among whom
the risk may be spread; the risk of structural failure can be passed
only to the owner in the form of increased design fees.
A fourth reason courts have not applied strict or absolute lia-
bility is that mass-produced products, even automobiles and air-
craft, can be effectively modeled before production to predict
124. The engineer's slipping grasp on construction practices is perhaps
most evident in structural steel detail design and fabrication. As limited design
funds force more detail work from the engineer's board squarely onto the
fabricator, fast track scheduling and persistent construction managers concen-
trate the engineer's connection review time. Concurrently, however, engineers
have adopted review stamps that disclaim or obfuscate responsibility for connec-
tion design and strength. Dallaire & Robison, Structural Steel Details: Is Responsi-
bilitya Problem? CIY. ENGINEERING-ASCE, Oct. 1983, at 51.
125. City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Minn. 1978)
(footnote omitted).
126. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, at 28, In re Federal Skywalk Cases, No. 81-0945 (W.D. Mo.,
filed May 4, 1983). See also Ursin, Strict Liability/or Defective Business Premises-One
Step Beyond Rowland and Greenman, 22 UCLA L. REV. 820, 823 (1974) (strict
liability for owners serves the policy of spreading the risk of accident losses be-
cause the owner can insure against the risk of loss and then pass the cost of
insurance on to his customers).
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accurately all operational characteristics. This is not so in the
case of structures. While some testing is possible, the sheer size
of buildings and other structures make impossible the destructive
testing of all connections, components, and interfaces between
the structure and building fabric.
Finally, the formulation of the products liability state of the
art defense demonstrates the doctrine's inapplicability to design
engineers. 127 Commentators define the product's state of the art
in terms of economic considerations like cost, utility, and ease of
assembly, in addition to technological factors like strength of
materials and availability of alternative designs. 128 For buildings,
however, those same economic factors must be accommodated
without sacrificing the integrity of the structure and imperiling
the public; cost considerations cannot compromise the structural
integrity of a design. 129
B. A Rejection of the Professional Standard
The "professional" standard,130 established by reference to
care exercised by other engineers, is likewise an inappropriate
measure of the engineers' performance. This objective standard,
keyed to the knowledge and skill "ordinarily possessed and exer-
cised," establishes only the minimum professionally acceptable
conduct. 131 Under the "reasonable man" concept, negligence
law requires prudent conduct-a standard somewhat above aver-
age. 132 Yet for professionals, the courts apparently consider a
"prudent" standard too high. 133 This may be so because proof of
127. For an explanation of the various formulations of the state of the art
defense, see supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
128. See generally O'Donnell, supra note 26; Raleigh, supra note 26.
129. See Behind All Those Roof Collapses, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 31,
1978, at I, col. 5. This article states that structural engineers are angry at being
blamed for collapses they feel are traceable to "[c]ost-cutting caused by compet-
itive bidding at design, materials, construction, and maintenance stages." Id.
The article continues:
[T]he fact is that in a competitive business, buildings are designed to
cope with l-in-20 year conditions, not l-in-50, or I-in-IOO ....
Faults show up particularly, say engineers, in the bulk-ordered roofs
used by discount supermarket chains which count every penny to make
their operations pay.
!d. at 22, cols. 1-3.
130. See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
131 ~ Curran, Professional Negligence-Some General Comments, 12 VAND. L. REV.
535,538 (1959). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A comment b
(1965).
132. Curran, supra note 131, at 538.
133. See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
430 VILLANOVA LAw REVIEW [Vol. 30: p. 403
compliance or noncompliance with acceptable practice is difficult,
and because the expert is required to testify as to general prac-
tices in a profession without clear guidelines. 134
C. A New Standard: The Informed Engineer
The missing element in present formulations of the profes-
sional standard of care for engineers is the place of scientific ad-
vances in the engineer's designs. Many design professionals
disdain new techniques, unless the technique either lowers pro-
ject and design costs or enables award-winning cutting-edge de-
signs. This same conservatism exists in other professions as well.
A pioneer doctor put it this way:
Researchers should be quarantined both for their own
good and for the good of the student. . . . The fact
should be recognized that the average doctor never does
catch up with what the researcher is doing. We doctors
should be spared the agony of the scientific delivery
room and should be allowed to hold the baby only after
the nurse has him all polished up and dressed}35
So too, practicing engineers may disdain newborn theories until
they are polished up and dressed in an undergraduate textbook
cover. Dean Prosser, however, suggests that the law should take a
different position:
[A]s scientific knowledge advances, and more and more
effective tests become available, what was excusable ig-
norance yesterday becomes negligent ignorance
today}36
In the field of medical practice, for example, one court im-
posed upon physicians a general duty to stay informed of present
day scientific knowledge}37 Another court required physicians to
read journals, solicit product data from manufacturers' represent-
atives, listen to tape recorded digests of current literature, and
134. For a discussion of the difficulties involved in expert testimony to es-
tablish a standard of care in a professional negligence case against a design pro-
fessional, see Annot., 3 A.L.R. 4th 1023 (1981).
135. A. HERTZLER, THE HORSE AND BUGGY DOCTOR 46 (1938).
136. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 53, § 32 (footnote omitted).
137. See Swan v. Lamb, 584 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah 1978). See also McCoid,
supra note 86, at 575-81.
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attend postgraduate courses and professional seminars. 138 Such
jurisdictions essentially have abrogated the locality rule, modified
the professional standard, and prevented the professional from
practicing in an out-of-date vacuum. Although dicta of some
courts indicate a willingness to adopt an "informed engineer"
standard,139 all courts should expressly recognize and apply this
higher standard of care to structural engineers. The engineer
should be expected to incorporate into his designs applicable ad-
vances in the profession that have reached the "professionally ac-
cepted" horizon of knowledge. 140
Under this standard the engineer is not held responsible for
cutting-edge research or technology that is not widely dissemi-
nated to practitioners, but only for accepted techniques published
in professional journals and accepted by the profession after a pe-
riod of time. 141 This national standard of the informed engineer
avoids the pitfalls of strict liability, but at the same time prevents
wholesale engineering practice at the "undergraduate" horizon
of minimum acceptable professional conduct. 142 The "informed"
standard provides a demonstrable level of conduct provable by
objective facts.
The advent of the Architecture and Engineering Perform-
ance Center (AEPIC) 143 at the University of Maryland and the
vast dissemination of structural research support the notion of
changing the standard. AEPIC opened in 1982 to collect, analyze
and disseminate information on the performance of structures in
an effort to prevent perpetuation of past design and construction
errors. The goal of AEPIC is to provide practicing engineers ac-
cess to a computer database of case files on successful and unsuc-
cessful structures, photographic files, and hard-bound dossiers
before they commence a similar design.
Judicial adoption of this new, informed standard would not,
of course, be without problems. Defendant engineers, their law-
yers and insurers will certainly make two arguments that test our
proposed standard. First, the level of "professionally accepted
138. Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 78-79,431 P.2d 973, 977-78
(1967).
139. See supra notes 84-97 and accompanying text.
140. See supra text following note 39.
141. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
143. AEPIC is an educational branch of the Schools of Architecture and
Civil Engineering at the University of Maryland. The National Science Founda-
tion provides funds for additional research and analysis.
432 VILLANOVA LAw REVIEW [Vol. 30: p. 403
knowledge" is never clear and possibly incapable of proof. Nu-
merous journals publish matters relating to structural engineer-
ing practice;144 one might ask which of these should be surveyed
to determine acceptance of a theory by the profession? In case of
conflicting theories, which should be accorded more weight?145
Furthermore, problems of courtroom proof that the engineer's
design either did or did not measure up to the "informed engi-
neer" standard remain as difficult as the problems of proof under
the current professional standard. 146
A second, fundamental objection to our standard arises on a
philosophic plane. Even with proof that a theory is accepted by
the profession at the time the disputed design was conceived, that
theory is not necessarily a rigid immutable law for all times. The
144. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Recent developments may
also be reported in AM. WATERWORKS Aj.,j. ENGINEERING MECHANICS, and PUB.
WORKS. Construction material trade associations, such as the American Iron
and Steel Institute, the American Institute of Steel Construction, the American
Concrete Institute, and the Portland Cement Association, also publish profes-
sional journals.
145. The absence of published contradictory articles is only implied sup-
port for a theory; if incorrect, a theory remains incorrect whether refuted or not,
and many incorrect theories are published. One observer of the scientific
method has stated:
The second continuum is the scale of scientific competence. It also has
its extremes-ranging from obviously admirable scientists, to men of
equally obvious incompetence.... Scientific journals today are filled
with bizarre theories. . . . If anything, scientific journals err on the
side of permitting questionable theses to be published, so they may be
discussed and checked in the hope of finding something of value.
Gardner, In the Name of Science, in SCIENCE: METHOD AND MEANING 34-37 (S.
Rapport & H. Wright eds. 1963) (emphasis in original). Thus it would not be
wise for courts invariably to draw the inference from an absence of contradictory
literature that a published theory is correct and has been accepted by the profes-
sion as a whole.
146. One commentator has criticized the professional standard because of
problems of proving what is "ordinarily exercised in the profession":
[E]ven where we are able to obtain professional witnesses for the plain-
tiff, what is their function? We ask these witnesses to give an "expert
opinion" ... [in court] ... on whether the defendant's action was in
conformity to the skill and learning "ordinarily exercised in the profes-
sion," or, whether it was "professionally acceptable conduct." Does
anyone practitioner know the answer to this? Is there really an an-
swer? Perhaps by some consensus or statistical study answers might be
obtained. . . . Witnesses ... who give "opinions" act individually
and in an uncontrolled way. Their opinions may not be representative.
They represent themselves, really, not "the profession." I wonder if we
d.on't actually have individuals judging the defendant and not the profes-
slon ....
Curran, supra note 131, at 539 (emphasis in original). Under our proposed stan-
dard the problems will remain in proving what constitutes "professionally ac-
cepted knowledge."
1985] ENGINEERS' LIABILIlY 433
history of science shows that even in the proclaimed exact sci-
ences such as physics, the principles and laws accepted at any
given time are subject to change. 147 As stated by Poincare:
[N]o particular law will ever be more than approximate
and probable. Scientists have never failed to recognize
this truth; only they believe, right or wrong, that every
law may be replaced by another closer and more prob-
able, that this new law will itself be only provisional, but
that the same movement can continue indefinitely, so
that science in progressing will possess laws more and
more probable, that the approximation will end by dif-
fering as little as you choose from exactitude and the
probability from certitude. 148
147. See M. GOLDSTEIN & I. GOLDSTEIN, How WE KNOW-AN EXPLORATION
OF THE SCIENTIFIC PROCESS (1978). Goldstein and Goldstein use Newton's theo-
rems as an example:
[Newton's] laws [of motion] could be written in the form of math-
ematical equations on half a page, and they governed all motions in
universe as well as on earth ... In this century Newton's laws were
found to fail when bodies move at very high speeds approaching the
velocity of light. New laws that apply to these high speeds were formu-
lated by Einstein. The results of Newton's laws became in tum a spe-
cial case-the special case when things move slowly.
/d. at 198-99. Another commentator has observed that "the fact is that every
theory, however majestic, has hidden assumptions which are open to challenge
and, indeed, in time will make it necessary to replace." J. BRONOWSKI, THE As-
CENT OF MAN 240 (1973).
148. H. POINCARE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE 341 (1913). See also J.
BRONOWSKI, supra note 147; B. RUSSELL, RELIGION AND SCIENCE 14-15 (1935)
(science is always tentative, expecting that modifications in its present theories
will sooner or later be found necessary); Weaver, Imperfections of Science, in SCI-
ENCE: METHOD AND MEANING 23-.24 (S. Rapport & H. Wright eds. 1963) (perfect
accuracy is unattainable in any measurement and certainty is impossible in any
prediction).
Recent writers in the legal literature seem to find more exactness in engi-
neering and science than do the philosophers of science. For example, the Kan-
sas Supreme Court recently stated:
[I]t can be said certain professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, are
not subject to such an implied warranty. However, an architect and an
engineer stand in much different posture as to insuring a given result
than does a doctor or lawyer. The work performed by architects and engineers
is an exact science; that performed by doctors and lawyers is not. A per-
son who contracts with an architect or engineer for a building of a cer-
tain size and elevation has a right to expect an exact result.
Tamarac Dev. Co. v. Delamater, Freund & Assocs., 234 Kan. 618, 622, 675 P.2d
361, 365 (1984) (emphasis added). And a recent American Bar AssociationJournal
article noted a "cultural difference" between technology and law:
Both legal and physical precedents are changeable, the first by courts
themselves or by legislatures, the second by confirmation of subse-
quent, differing theory.
Another frequently cited difference in the two cultures turns on
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Changes and progressions of scientific understanding affect
engineeringI49 in two ways: the "laws" of science change, and the
methods engineers use to apply science change. Recognizing
this, so the argument might go, the law of professional malprac-
tice should not pretend to acknowledge a body of accepted struc-
tural engineering knowledge as forever valid. The current
"professional standard" may be somewhat arbitrary and difficult
of proof, the argument would continue, but at least it is admit-
tedly arbitrary. By contrast, the proposed "informed engineer"
standard pretends to embody current knowledge, but such know-
ledge is admittedly subject to change. The structural engineer,
then, who has not incorporated current "accepted knowledge"
should not be penalized since today's "accepted" theory may be
modified or disproved tomorrow.
A corollary to this second argument arises when a structural
design incorporates "accepted" knowledge and practice, but the
structure collapses because what was accepted was in fact inva-
lid. I50 Similarly, there are already suggestions in the literature
that use of computer-aided design techniques are hurting overall
design quality because the structural engineer loses the "feel" for
structures and materials. 151 These concerns raise a larger di-
lemma of whether the law should actively promote progress or
suggest restraint in keeping abreast of progress.
Despite these arguments, we adhere to our contention ,that
courts should require the structural engineer to use currently ac-
concepts of "fact" and "truth." A scientist or engineer must attach a
very high probability, say 90-plus percent, to a phenomenon before be-
ing willing to move it from the realm of speculation to fact.
The litigation process . . . normally requires only a preponder-
ance of evidence, perhaps something more than 50%, to find "facts"
necessary to the resolution of a dispute.
Nyhart & Jones, What You Don't Know About Technology Can Hurt You, 69 A.B.A. J.
1667, 1667 (1983).
149. Engineering is defined as "the application of science and mathematics
by which the properties of matter and sources of energy in nature are made
useful to man in structures, machines, products systems, and processes." WEB-
STER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 375 (1981).
150. The medical literature reports cases where doctors followed recent
medical advances too well, only to learn later, for example, of side effects of a
particular drug which were not known at the time of use. See McCoid, supra note
86, at 549, 580-81.
151. AlA, supra note 3, at 10 (use of computers hinders engineers' ability to
determine whether there was an error in the assumptions upon which calcula-
tions are based); Thornton, Lessons Learnedfrom Recent Long Span Roof Failures, in
LONG SPAN ROOF STRUCTURES 89, 91 (ASCE 1981); Kansas City Star, Oct. 28,
1981, at A-4, col. 6 (statements by chairman of ASCE Commission on Failed and
Damaged Buildings).
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cepted theories and practices in designing structures. The recent
plethora of structural failures, some with loss of life, dictates that
the law, like science, should move in the direction of progress.
Courtroom proof of liability is difficult under the current stan-
dard, but it should be no more difficult or uncertain under our
proposal. An objection based on the absence of rigid, immutable
scientific laws could be raised against any legal standard. Even
design principles taught in undergraduate curricula could be su-
perseded eventually. To concede that scientific theories are never
fixed is not to say each is not an improvement over its
predecessor. 152
D. Defensive Measures
A review of alternative defensive measures for the practi-
tioner is appropriate, lest engineers and their counsel reject the
"informed" standard out of hand as patently unreasonable. Six
"office practice" suggestions and one possible legal solution are
proposed as available alternatives to limit the impact of the "in-
formed" standard of care.
1. OJfice Practices
First, as a cardinal rule, an engineer must know the limits of
his or her capabilities and never undertake more than he or she
can professionally-not merely competently-complete.153 Sec-
152. The imerface between law and scientific or technological advances is
discussed in a series of articles developed by the National Conference of Law-
yers and Scientists and published in the American Bar Association Journal. See
Green, Should Technology Assessment Guide Public Policy?, 69 A.B.A.]. 930 (1983)
(assessment of the risks, benefits, and costs of technical advancements should be
based on democratic principles); Jasanoff & Nelkin, Science, Technology, and the
Limits ofJudicial Competence, 68 A.B.A.]. 1094 (1982) (traditional processes of
adjudication are inadequate to handle technological litigation); Markey, Science
and the Law: A Dialogue on Understanding, 68 A.B.A.]. 154 (1982) (scientific ques-
tions should be capable of definitive answers before expert testimony is admit-
ted; courts should not attempt to determine scientific truth); Myrick & Sprowl,
Patent Law for Programmed Computers and Programmed Life Forms, 68 A.B.A.]. 920
(1982) (development of laboratory life forms underscores the necessity offlexi-
bility in the law regarding scientific advances); Nyhart Be Jones, supra note 117
(legal decisions are not the best answers to technical questions); Ramo, Regula-
tion ofTechnowgicaLActivities: A New Approach, 67 A.B.A.]. 1456 (1981) (all factors,
not just harm to the environmem, must be considered before regulations are
promulgated); Thornton, Uses and Abuses of Forensic Science, 69 A.B.A. ]. 288
(1983) (the law frequently errs in deeming science a product rather than a
process).
153. The codes of ethics of various professional engineering societies ad-
here to the same rule. For example, the code of the American Society of Civil
Engineers says that "[e]ngineers shall perform services only in areas of their
competence." AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, CODE OF ETHICS Canon
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ond, at least one member of the firm should continually review
the professional journals and periodically attend seminars to ac-
quire knowledge of advances prior to their inclusion in design
manuals .154 Third, each design should incorporate a review of all
available information on the performance of similar structures
based on data obtained through AEPIC or other sources. 155
Fourth, the structural engineer should retain an independent
proof engineer to analyze all major designs, not just to check
mathematical computations. 156 Fifth, the engineer might request
scale model strength tests of innovative designs, components, or
member-critical systems like the space frame. Even full-scale test-
ing might be done in some cases. 157 Sixth, the owner and engi-
neer should consider full-time engineering supervision during the
erection of critical elements of systems to ensure proper construc-
tion sequencing and procedures. 158 This suggestion is made de-
2 (1980). Section 6 of the Code of Ethics of the National Society of Professional
Engineers states: "The Engineer will undertake engineering assignments for
which he will be responsible only when qualified by training or experience; and
he will engage, or advise engaging, experts and specialists whenever the client's
or employer's interests are best served by such service." NATIONAL SOCIETY OF
PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS, ETHICS FOR ENGINEERS. CODE OF ETHICS § 6. Breach
of one of the duties under an ethical code can lead to expulsion from the
Society.
154. See supra notes 39 & 144.
155. For a discussion of the role AEPIC can play in facilitating dissemina-
tion of advances in the engineering field, see supra note 143 and accompanying
text.
156. See Thornton, supra note 151, at 91.
157. For example, engineers load tested the space frame roof of the Gerald
R. Ford Presidential Museum in Grand Rapids, Michigan, prior to application of
the roof deck. Total cost: $40,000, or 1.3% of the building's total $3,000,000
cost. Space Frame Safety Issue Sparks Full-Scale Load Test, ENGINEERING NEWS REC.,
Sept. 18, 1980, at 39.
158. Support for this proposition comes from the profession itself. See, e.g.,
AlA, supra note 3, at 8, 12 (by supervising construction, engineers put them-
selves in a better position to discover defects in the work); Thornton, supra note
151, at 89, 90, 94-95.
Full time supervision may; however, create liability for construction site ac-
cidents. See Balagna v. Shawnee County, 233 Kan. 1068,668 P.2d 157 (1983);
Hanna v. Huer,]ohns, Neel, Rivers & Webb, 233 Kan. 206, 662 P.2d 243 (1983);
Comment, Architects' Liability for Construction Site Accidents, 30 U. KAN. L. REV. 429
(1982) (architect must contractually assume control of contractor's methods and
procedures before a duty to protect workers arises).
In 1983, the Florida legislature enacted a law that requires employment of a
full-time, qualified inspector during the erection of structural components of all
major buildings. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 553.79(5)(A) (West 1983). Any structure
that exceeds 25,000 square feet in floor area, that is greater than two stories or
twenty-five feet in height, that has an assembly occupancy greater than 5,000
square feet, or is of unusual design or construction technique triggers the in-
spector provision. Id. § 553.71 (6). Residential structures of three stories or less
are exempt from the inspection requirement. /d.
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spite changes in the AlA and NSPE standard contract documents
that have moved the design professional away from project super-
vision into periodic inspection. 159 Compliance with the first three
suggestions satisfies the engineer's duty to stay informed, while
the review involved in the last three should help eliminate negli-
gent procedures and result in a safe, suitable structure. More-
over, design review, testing, and supervision costs are all directly
chargeable to the project owner.
2. A Contractural Alternative: Indemnity Clauses
A crucial but unspoken issue underlying the structural engi-
neer's liability is which of the parties should bear responsibility
for developmental risks?160 In economic terms, the engineer can
either increase precautions against failure by providing design re-
dundancy, thus increasing construction costs, or, ifhis bargaining
position is strong enough, seek indemnification from the owner
for any resulting liability.161 Either alternative has the effect of
allocating the risk of liability and/or the costs of avoiding liability
to the project owner. 162 Owners' agreements to indemnify engi-
neers for negligent performance of design responsibilities are
strictly construed but generally upheld 163 unless prohibited by
159. AlA, supra note 43, Document A-201, ~ 2.2.3 (1976 ed.) (architect
shall visit construction site at intervals appropriate to the stage of construction
to familiarize himself with the progress and quality of work); NSPE, supra note
51, Document 1910-1, ~ 1.6.2 (1979 ed.). See also Wheeler & Lewis v. Slifer, 195
Colo. 291, 577 P.2d 1092 (1978) (contractual authority of architect to stop work
to assure proper execution of contract did not impose a duty on architect to see
that work was performed safely); Brown v. Gamble Constr. Co., 537 S.W.2d 685
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (architects under no duty to supervise construction unless
they expressly agree to do so).
160. See Stanton & Dugdale, supra note 102, at 585.
161. When owners have the bargaining edge, they might insist on just the
opposite, i.e., that the engineer indemnify the owner. One commentator notes
that
[d]uring the past five years, architects and engineers have increasingly
been besieged with demands from their clientS for indemnification pro-
visions in professional services agreements requiring the architect or
engineer to indemnify their clients. This recent trend, which started on
the west coast, has now swept the country.
P. Purcell, Dangers of Hold Harmless and Indemnification Agreements: Legal
Liability and Insurability I, Presentation at 24th Annual Meeting of Invited At-
torneys, Savannah (May 10, 1985) (available at Villanova LAw Review office).
162. Jd. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECON. I, 10-11
(1960).
163. See Batson-Cook Co. v. Industrial Steel Erectors, 257 F.2d 410, 413-14
(5th Cir. 1958); DeFelice v. English, 91 Misc. 2d 1109,399 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1977)
(a tortfeasor may not be denied indemnification because his negligence was ac-
tive), aiJ'd, 63 A.D.2d 976, 406 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1978); see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 192 comment b (1981) (a promise to indemnify is
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statute l64 or against public policy.165 If the owner clearly and un-
equivocally agrees to indemnify the engineer, the engineer's lia-
bility exposure to the owner is significantly reduced. 166
Alternatively, the parties can agree that the owner will purchase
insurance to cover an anticipated risk, which has the effect of in-
demnifying the engineer against his own negligence. 167
V. CONCLUSION
Today, the structural engineer occupies an unenviable posi-
tion in the design profession. As project owners demand that ar-
chitects create novel, innovative solutions to old space enclosure
or spanning problems, the engineer must use proven methodolo-
gies to design the structure within the architect's aesthetic param-
eters. He has some room for innovation, but ultimately he must
recognize the impact of statics, dynamics, and. strength of materi-
als on such diverse structures as a television tower, a 4,000 foot-
long suspension bridge, or a simple warehouse roof. Long span
designs with fewer redundant elements, lessened resistance to
member buckling, and greater threat to human life increase the
engineer's design responsibilities. 168 Structural failures in cutting
edge designs like space frame roof structures are most often
caused by gross design negligence or construction errors rather
than by deficiencies in materials or fabrication. 169
unobjectionable if the tortious act is only an undesired possibility and the prom-
ise does not tend to induce its commission).
164. E.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 2782 (West 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 2704 (1974). See also Anti-Indemnijication Statutes, in XIII GUIDELINES FOR IM-
PROVING PRACTICE, ARCHITECTS & ENGINEERS PROFESSIONAL LIABILIlY No. 8
(V.O. Schinnerer & Co. 1983).
165. See Tunkl v. Regents ofUniv. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 98-100,383 P.2d
441, 445-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36-38 (1963) (invalidating exculpatory provisions
found in contracts where indemnitee provides an essential service).
166. By entering into an indemnification agreement with the engineer, the
owner indemnitor deprives his insurer of the right to subrogation and may for-
feit his liability insurance. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Altfillisch Constr. Co., 70
Cal. App. 3d 789, 131 Cal. Rptr. 91 (1977). But see Great N. Oil Co. v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 291 Minn. 97, 99, 189N.W.2d 404, 406 (1971) (in the
absence of an express prohibition in the insurance policy against entering into
exculpatory indemnity agreements, an insured owner may release a contractor
for negligently causing a loss); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Universal Mortgage
Corp., 82 Wise. 2d 170,262 N.W.2d 92 (1978).
167. Tuxedo Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Lie-Nielson, 245 Ga. 27, 262
S.E.2d 794 (1980); South Tippecanoe Sch. Bldg. Corp. v. Shambaugh & Son,
Inc., 182 Ind. App. 350, 395 N.E.2d 320 (1979).
168. AlA, supra note 3, at 3-4, 12. See Christian Science Monitor, supra nole
129.
169. See Cuoco, supra note 8.
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The rapid development of new design theories and solutions
demands redefinition of the engineer's standard of care, based on
verifiable and comprehensible criteria. Our suggested solution
follows a theory's chronological development from inception at
the cutting edge, publication in trade journals, acceptance after a
period of maturation and refinement, and eventual inclusion in
design standards and undergraduate texts. Once a theory is ac-
cepted by the profession, the engineer should have a duty to in-
form himself of that theory and apply it in practice. The
practicing engineer should read the journal literature and attend
professional seminars to acquire knowledge of these advances
prior to their inclusion in design manuals. Current topics in
structural engineering open literature include design considera-
tions for steel fatigue, brittle fracture, and stress concentrations.
Public safety demands that the law recognize successive improve-
ments and hold engineers responsible for recognizing and incor-
porating them as well. Project owners deserve the latest design to
extend the longevity of their investment. The public deserves
protection from deficient structures. The engineer owes himself
decreased liability exposure arising from structural failures.
